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When the Intellectual Property Redux conference
was first announced two or so years ago, I remember
having both a positive and negative reaction. The positive
reaction was, "Wow, what a great idea for a conference."
The negative reaction was, "Oh man, why didn't I think of
it first?" But now that I have been included, all negative
thoughts have washed away.

* Professor of Law and Austin Owen Research Scholar, University of
Richmond School of Law. I would like to thank Ann Bartow for
including me in the Intellectual Property Redux conference, Corinna
Lain for editing this essay (and just about everything else I've ever
written), and Jane Savoca for being my own Fortuna Redux.
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The article I am here to revisit is Risk Aversion and
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 1 which was
published in 2007. I'm going to give a brief recap of the
thesis and then tum to a few things I got wrong, some
subsequent scholarship, various developments in practice,
and the airing of grievances.
I.

RECAP OF ARGUMENT

First, the recap. If I had to sum up the article's
thesis in one sentence, it would be this: licensing is not only
an output of the system of entitlements that intellectual
property law creates, but an input into that system as
well-and current law skews that input in ways that lead to
the expansion of intellectual property entitlements in
copyright and trademark over time.
I was hardly the first scholar to observe that
intellectual property entitlements had expanded, or that
much of the expansion was unwarranted. But most of the
prior commentary had focused on legislative capture and
court decisions. In other words, it portrayed a purposeful
expansion, fueled by rightsholders and manifested in the
positive law.
In contrast, I focused on a more inadvertent, organic
expansion that could be found in both copyright and
trademark. My thesis was that in certain vital contexts, the
expansion had more to do with the structural indeterminacy
of important intellectual property doctrines than with
conscious policy or political decisions by legislators and
judges. That is, even if the statutes were left unamended
for years on end and no cases made it to court, copyright
and trademark rights would expand over time through an
1

James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALEL.J. 882 (2007).
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incremental and mostly inadvertent process of accretion.
The term "accretion" was important; the expansion happens
over time, small piece by small piece, like a coral reef
Indeed, looking back, I wish I'd called the article Rights
Accretion and Risk Aversion in Intellectual Property Law,
not Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, because I think the rights accretion part was
more important and that I made some mistakes in my
discussion of the role of risk.
I'll get to my mistakes later, but first back to the
recap. It's easiest to understand my idea using copyright
law.
My premises, which at the time were pretty
uncontroversial, were as follows.
First, important doctrines in copyright law are
notoriously indeterminate.
These include substantial
similarity, the idea/expression dichotomy, and (most
important) fair use.2 As a result, it can be very difficult to
determine ahead of time whether a given act of copying is
infringing. Gray areas abound.
Second, for the user of copyrighted material, the
mere threat of an infringement case can be daunting. The
strong possibility of injunctive relief, including preliminary
injunctions, could halt a project in its tracks, very
expensively, creating holdup power. And the specter of
statutory damages also gave rightsholders a lot of
leverage. 3
Finally, there are often multiple players on the
copyright-user side of a licensing transaction. For example,
a documentary filmmaker who wants to use a copyrighted
2

3

Id. at 888-91.
Id. at 890, 942-45.

Volume 60- Number 1

48 IDEA - The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property

photograph in her film must consider not only the copyright
holder, but also the film's errors and omissions insurer, her
producers, future distributors, downstream broadcasters,
and so on. These parties tend to approach legal issues very
conservatively, particularly when the legal issue has the
potential to destroy or delay the entire project. This brings
us to the risk aversion part of the thesis: all these
constituents would pressure copyright users like our
filmmaker to pay a little now rather than risk paying a lot
later. 4
In combination, these premises led to the conclusion
(also uncontroversial) that when copyright users
incorporate existing copyrighted material into their new
project, they usually get permission and pay a licensing fee
rather than risk litigation over substantial similarity, fair
use, etc. and face the threat of an injunction and statutory
damages. 5 It's called a "clearance culture." 6 License, don't
litigate. Better safe than sued.
The final ingredient in my argument, which I called
"doctrinal feedback," emerged from the fair use doctrine.
The most important fair use factor is the effect of the
defendant's use on the rightsholder' s market. 7 But this
4

Id. at 890-94.
Id. at 894-95.
6
See, e.g., PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR Soc.
MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS
CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS (2005).
7
This factor is found at 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). For proof of its
importance, see, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1985); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich.
Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996); Triangle
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175
(5th Cir. 1980); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
COPYRIGHT§ 13.05[A][4] (2019) ("If one looks to the fair use cases, if
not always to their stated rationale, this emerges as the most important,
5
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factor is subject to circular reasoning: until we decide
whether the defendant's use is fair, it's impossible to say
that the plaintiff has any right to exploit the market that the
defendant's use represents. Copyright law tries to avoid
this circularity by focusing only on real markets-e.g.,
markets that already exist or that the copyright owner is
likely to develop. 8
If you put this all together, you can see the problem.
It works like this. In Year One, I want to make use of your
copyrighted work. There is no established licensing market
for my use, so although I'm in a gray area, I figure that I
have a good shot-we'll peg it at eighty percent-at a fair
use defense. But that still leaves a twenty percent chance
the use might be ruled infringing. With all the dire
consequences that come with infringement, and with all the
pressure I am feeling from my insurer, distributor, etc., I
decide not to take that chance; I get a license from you
instead. Over time, other similarly situated actors follow
suit. So by Year Three, bit by bit, there has emerged a
widespread, active licensing market for the kind of use in
which I engaged. This means that in Year Four, the
chances of winning a fair use argument for that use have

and indeed, central fair use factor." (footnotes omitted)); Barton Beebe,
An Empirical Study of the U.S. Copyright Fair Use Cases, 1978-2005,
156 U. PENN. L. REV. 549, 617 (2008) (showing empirically that
winning the fourth-factor argument corresponds highly to winning the
entire fair use argument and arguing that it "essentially constitutes a
metafactor under which courts integrate their analyses of the other three
factors and, in doing so, arrive at the outcome not simply of the fourth
factor, but of the overall test.").
8
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994)
(suggesting that courts focus on markets "that creators of original
works would in general develop or license others to develop"); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994)
(suggesting that courts focus on markets that are "traditional,
reasonable, or likely to be developed").
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dropped considerably (because the existence of the
licensing market militates against a fair use finding). So
now the use that was eighty percent/twenty percent in favor
of fair use is more like twenty percent/eighty percent
against. The risk-averse preference for licensing has fed
back around into the doctrinal analysis and the reach of
copyright rights has expanded. And because fair use has
narrowed, a use that would have been a one hundred
percent slam dunk for fair use five years earlier is now
more like eighty percent/twenty percent, and the user may
now start thinking about a license, and the whole cycle
starts again. 9 Again, licensing is both an input and an
output in the copyright system.
The same input/output dynamic is present in
trademark law, although it's a little more situational, so I'll
run through it quickly. Trademark's consumer confusion
standard can be very hard to apply in nontraditional
contexts, like the appearance of a trademarked good in a
video or film. It does not help that courts use a wide
variety of terminology when articulating the kind of
confusion that's actionable, from the Lanham Act's
"sponsorship" and "approval" terminology, to whether the
relationship between the parties is one of endorsement,
affiliation,
associat10n,
connection,
authorization,
perm1ss1on, or license, to whether the use produced
confusion "of any kind." Attached to these descriptors
comes a host of catch-all modifiers, selected precisely for
their imprecision: Was there confusion as to whether the
mark owner "otherwise" approved or was "in some other
way" connected? Was there a relationship "of some sort"
or a suggestion that the defendant's product emanated "in

9

Gibson, supra note 1, at 898-900.
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some way" from the mark owner? Will consumers "in
some fashion" associate the plaintiff and defendant? 10
As those terms suggest, consumer confusion will
largely be a function of consumer understandings of when a
license is needed. And consumers do indeed become aware
of these licensing practices in subtle ways. For example,
everyone has seen reality shows and music videos that
routinely "blur out" certain logos and other trademarks,
presumably because the producers were unable to get the
relevant license. The absence of any "blurring out" thus
becomes more significant-it implies at the very least that
permission has been given, and it is a short hop from
permission to affiliation or endorsement. The increasing
incidence of merchandising and product placement may
play a role here too: as consumers come to understand that
a brand often appears in a toy or movie because of a
financial deal between the filmmaker and the brand owner
(e.g., James Bond doesn't drive a BMW by coincidence),
they will start to assume that any such appearance
represents a deal with, and thus a tacit endorsement by, the
brand owner. This in tum allows the brand owner to sue
filmmakers who use brands without permission under a
consumer confusion theory, which in tum causes more
conservative licensing practices, and so on. 11 Thus we see
doctrinal feedback of the trademark variety.
10

Id. at 908-12.
Id. at 915-23. The behavioral sciences have a name for consumers'
understanding of the promotional nature of the marketing efforts that
bombard them and their ability to appreciate and manage their own
reactions thereto. It is called "persuasion knowledge," and my article
went into it in some detail. See id. Indeed, in an early draft of the
article, I claimed to be the first to use the concept of persuasion
knowledge in legal scholarship. Barton Beebe saved me from
including this claim in the final version by pointing me to an earlier
article: Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103
MICH. L. REV. 2020 (2005). I was embarrassed to have missed that
11
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II.

ERRORS

So that's the basic argument of the article. I went
on to suggest some possible solutions, but here I'd like to
focus instead on things I got wrong.

A.

Accounting for Risk

I can think of two errors I made in the way the
article accounted for risk. The first is that I completely
ignored the insights from prospect theory and other sources
about how risk is perceived and addressed in the real
world. 12 In short, I oversimplified by assuming risk
aversion on the part of users of copyrighted works and
trademarked goods. As Steven Horowitz and Andres
Sawicki later pointed out, copyright users may in fact be
more risk-seeking than the rest of the population. 13
The second mistake I made about risk may have
inadvertently fixed the first mistake: I overemphasized the
importance of risk aversion in the doctrinal feedback
dynamic. 14 Most of what I proposed worked perfectly fine
even when the user was not risk-averse. After all, there are
lots of costs to litigating that would push a perfectly
piece in my research, but I would have been more embarrassed to have
published the claim, so I remain grateful to Barton for this tip, which he
delivered more graciously and diplomatically than I deserved.
12
The foundational article is Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
13
Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright's Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI.
L. REV. 331 (2012); Andres Sawicki, Risky IP, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 81
(2016).
14
I claim no credit for making one mistake that balances out another.
As a very wise man once said, "The designer of such a system looks
more like Rube Goldberg than Vilfredo Pareto."
See James
Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1641, 1699 (2008).
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rational decisionmaker toward licensing. First, of course,
there are the litigation costs themselves; I don't know of
any empirical studies that show how often attorney's fees
are awarded to the prevailing party, but from an ex ante
perspective I would not be confident in predicting such an
outcome for a client that was considering litigating one of
these indeterminate doctrines.
So even a successful
defense would probably cost the defendant its attorney's
fees. Second, the holdup power that comes with an
injunction (especially a preliminary injunction) can be
significant, whether you're risk-averse, risk-neutral, or riskseeking. Third, in many copyright cases statutory damages
would be available, which will usually increase the
exposure for losing the case by an order of magnitude or
two above licensing costs. 15 Finally, when someone wins a
fair use case, he or she externalizes a lot of the benefits 16which I like as an academic, but which would push me
toward licensing as a user.
Faced with these
considerations, even a risk-neutral or risk-seeking party
might lean toward licensing.
I said as much in the article, 17 but I breezed by it
and moved quickly to focus on risk-averse parties. And
15

This is not to say that statutory damages would always be awarded;
Ben Depoorter has recently done some excellent empirical work that
shows this is not the case. See Ben Depoorter, Copyright Enforcement
in the Digital Age: When the Remedy Is the Wrong, 66 UCLA L. REV.
400 (2019). But because statutory damages are supracompensatory,
even a low risk of an award will matter to a risk-neutral defendant.
16
These externalities can take many forms, one of which is that a fair
use ruling provides value to third parties who may have their own fair
use questions in the future. Gibson, supra note 1, at 940-41. Another
is that fair use exists in part to allow a user to proceed with a use that
confers benefits on third parties. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining
the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 49-53 (1997).
17
Gibson, supra note 1, at 890-901 (copyright), 925 (trademark).
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putting "risk aversion" in the article's ti t1 e naturally
suggested that it was a necessary part of the equation rather
than something that would exacerbate an already existing
tendency. (Here, years later, I've left "Risk Aversion" out
of the title of this article. There-all fixed!)
B.

Collective Action Solutions

The other major error I made in the article is
something I am happy to have gotten wrong. My article
described what is essentially a prisoner's dilemma. In
theory, to stop rights accretion, all similarly situated users
could get together and agree not to seek licenses for a given
kind of use. 18 In practice, I thought this presented an
intractable collective action problem, especially when one
considers that they'd not only have to agree with each
other, but also convince the other interested parties on their
sides
of
the
transaction-insurers,
distributors,
broadcasters, etc.-to buy into the decision not to license. 19
I was mistaken. Certain groups of copyright users
have indeed managed to get together and solve these
challenges, under the leadership of Patricia Aufderheide at
American University (with help from Peter Jaszi). It
started with documentary filmmakers, who created a very
detailed and very reasonable Documentary Filmmakers'
Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use. 20 That was not too
significant in and of itself, but they also got the other
interested parties, such as their insurers, to buy into the
statement. Pat and friends then followed with similar codes
18
19
20

Id. at 903.
Id.
Ass'N OF INDEPENDENT VIDEO

& FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENT-

ARY FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE

(2005), https ://ems impact. org/code/documentary-filmmakers-statement
-of-best-practices-in-fair-use [https://perma.cc/GML 7-KAWE].

60 IDEA 45 (2020)

Rights Accretion Redux

55

for journalism, online video, course syllabi, museums,
visual arts, media literacy education, and academic and
research libraries. 21 I don't know whether each of these
codes has fully penetrated the corresponding industry, but
at least in the documentary world they seem to have had a
real impact.
If I'm talking about collective action solutions, I
should do another shout-out. Around the time that I wrote
my article, Wendy Seltzer (now at the World Wide Web
Consortium) was doing some interesting work on takedown
practices. 22 The site she founded (originally known as
Chilling Effects, now known as Lumen)2 3 has been a great
resource for those who want to push back against
overreaching rightsholders-which is one way of
combating the doctrinal feedback that would come from
giving in to overreach and licensing uses that don't need to
be licensed. I'm not sure the site is a comprehensive
solution to the rights accretion problem, but the first step in
solving a collective action problem is collection, and the
site is excellent at collection.

Ill.

SUBSEQUENT SCHOLARSHIP

So those are some things I got wrong. I am sure
there are more, but I want to shift to talking about
subsequent scholarship related to the article, which I don't

21

See Codes, CENTER FOR MEDIA & SOCIAL IMPACT, https://cmsimpac
t.org/resources/codes [https://perma.cc/R3A J-LKRD] (last visited July
14, 2019).
22
See, e.g., Wendy Seltzer, The Politics of Internet Control and
Delegated Censorship (2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=l496056 [https://perma.cc/9J YT-4QXB] (last visited July
14, 2019).
23
See LUMEN, https://www.lumendatabase.org [https://perma.cc/GER
9-NH74] (last visited July 14, 2019).

Volume 60- Number 1

56 IDEA - The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property
think has proved me wrong, but which has introduced some
things to think about that I didn't fully address.

A.

Pushback

A number of scholars, in commenting on the article
itself or in related work, have pushed back on some of my
assumptions and conclusions.
When my article was
published, Rebecca Tushnet was kind enough to write a
short accompanying piece, in which she pointed out several
doctrines in trademark law (like functionality and
descriptive fair use) that help combat the rights accretion
problem that I identified. 24 And I think she is correct that
trademark law has more readily available tools to fight
rights accretion than copyright does-which may be one
reason why rights accretion is less evident in trademark
than in copyright-although whether either area of law has
been effectively using those tools is a more troubling
question.
Certainly, the most recent development m
copyright's functionality doctrine is not encouraging. 25
Wendy Gordon also wrote a response, in which she
pointed out (among other things) that there are
circumstances in which the market is simply not the place
we look for appropriateness of licensing, even in the
absence of risk aversion and doctrinal feedback. 26 Take the
Sony Betamax case. 27 If that's a market failure case, then
24

Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Jsn 't Always Right: ProducerBased Limits on Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 352 (2007).
25
See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002,
1013 n.2 (2017) (holding that anything you can imagine can be
copyrighted unless it's a shovel).
26
Wendy J. Gordon, The "Why" ofMarkets: Fair Use and Circularity,
116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 358 (2007).
27
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
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maybe it's not good law anymore; in a world of Hulu and
Netflix, the transaction costs of authorized home viewing
are much lower than they were when the case was decided.
But if it's a case about values that aren't marketdetermined, like the right to do as you please in the privacy
of your own home, then it's probably still good law. 28
Wendy should know, having written the foundational
article on fair use as market failure and its application to
the Betamax case, 29 and I think she was right in her
commentary on my article. I was focused on the way the
licensing market creates the feedback loop, so I didn't
attend as much to non-market values. In my defense, I did
acknowledge those values when I reviewed possible
solutions to rights accretion, 30 but I was looking for a
solution that was more normatively neutral-one that
would solve the problem without assuming any particular
view of, say, privacy rights-so I dismissed them.
The most sustained pushback against my thesis,
however, came from a number of scholars, such as Pam
Samuelson, Neil Netanel, and Matt Sag, who argue both
theoretically and empirically that fair use is not so
unpredictable. 31 They do so by categorizing fair use cases.
28

See Gordon, supra note 26, at 360-61 (recognizing the argument
that the Sony case was about "privacy and proper behavior" rather than
pure economics).
29
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
30
Gibson, supra note 1, at 946 (recognizing that "some copyright
commentators prize fair use because it protects certain ideals (e.g.,
privacy, free speech) that resist all market valuation, externalized or
not.").
31
Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012);
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537
(2009); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS
& CLARKL. REV. 715 (2011).
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I think that work is very interesting and illuminates the
changing nature of fair use, and particularly the way that
transformative use has become one of the most important
battles to win as a fair use litigant. But in the end, even
after reading all those studies, I don't think fair use is more
predictable. Take Matt's study, for example. We have to
have a transformative use (itself a contested issue), plus
partial copying, plus an individual as a defendant before we
get to an eighty-seven percent chance to win-and we're
still within a standard deviation of the seventies, which
would give even a risk-neutral user pause. 32 And that's
ignoring the selection bias that arises from looking at
published cases only.
In short, I think that Larry Lessig's quip from
fifteen years ago-that the fair use right is so indeterminate
that it's really just "the right to hire a lawyer"-is still
correct today. 33 And even when you hire a lawyer, that
lawyer is likely to advise you to license rather than litigate.
In fact, I do some consulting work, and even with clients
whose fair use cases I am pretty confident I could win in
court, I have consistently advised them to get a license
instead. I do this knowing full well that I am fueling the
very dynamic that I complained about in my scholarship.
The fact that I can confidently classify the case as
transformative, or categorize it within a group of fair use
cases involving similar factors, has not significantly
affected the decision calculus that I use as a lawyer with
my clients' interests in mind.
Remember also that fair use is just one of the
doctrines that leads to unpredictability about the need for a
license. Substantial similarity is a moving target, as is
32

Sag, supra note 31, at 79-80.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) ("[F]air use ...
simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.").

33
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idea/expression-consider the recent Blurred Lines and
Led Zeppelin cases. 34 The feedback loop closes in fair use
and its fourth-factor discussion of markets. But it does not
necessarily begin in fair use; the uncertainty that prompts
the license can originate in other indeterminate doctrines
too.

B.

Follow-On Scholarship

Now, about scholarship that expanded, rather than
pushed back against, my central thesis. I only wrote one
such article myself 35 In retrospect, it might have been
better for my career if I had written a slew of follow-on
articles that flogged the same horse. But honestly, after one
or two articles on the same subject, I get bored. I want to
learn about something new rather than become more expert
in something familiar. So, true to form, I wrote one more
article about doctrinal feedback and then went off to write
about boilerplate contracts, 36 the death penalty, 37 and online
platforms. 38 (Not all in the same article.)
34

Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018) (Blurred Lines
case); Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2018), reh 'g
en bane granted, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019).
35
James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care, 94
VA. L. REV. 1641 (2008).
36
James Gibson, Boilerplate's False Dichotomy, 106 GEO. L.J. 249
(2018); James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
161 (2013).
37
James Gibson & Corinna Barrett Lain, Death Penalty Drugs and the
International Moral Marketplace, 103 GEO. L.J. 1215 (2015).
38
Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Higher Education and the
DMCA, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2018); Christopher A. Cotropia &
James Gibson, Convergence and Conflation in Online Copyright, 105
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). Indeed, the only other intellectual
property scholarship I have published since the Rights Accretion article
is Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside ofIntellectual
Property's Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921 (2010), and Christopher
A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Copyright's Topography: An Empirical
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That said, one of the most gratifying things from my
career as a law professor has been to see other scholars take
my observations from the article and deploy them furthersometimes in ways that I'd foreseen, but often in ways that
I hadn't. It's a really nice example of how scholarship is
supposed to work. All professors sometimes publish
articles that seem to disappear into the ether, for reasons
that may have nothing to do with the merits of the piece.
So, when that doesn't happen, it's really rewarding-it
restores one's faith in the weird "venture capital" system
that is modem legal scholarship.
I've already referred to some of this subsequent
scholarship when I was discussing mistakes that I made and
the people that identified and corrected those mistakes.
When that happens, it's not quite as gratifying as seeing
others elaborate on one's research, but it too is an important
part of how we develop knowledge in the academy. And as
I've already mentioned, the criticisms were mostly spot on,
and in some cases solved problems that I wanted solved but
didn't think could so easily be solved, so I was more than
happy to be proved wrong.
But back to the scholarship that has built off of the
article in various ways. There have been articles that get at
some of the moving parts of doctrinal feedback by trying to
cabin overreaching rightsholders in various ways, like by
imposing penalties for overreaching and regulating ceaseand-desist practices. 39 There have been articles that apply
the theory to other areas of intellectual property, such as
hot news, technological implementation of notice-and-

Study of Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1981 (2014), neither of
which dealt with the doctrinal feedback phenomenon.
39
E.g., Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and
Right-of-Publicity Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1293 (2016).
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takedown, and the right of publicity. 40 I think the fit with
the right of publicity is particularly good, as I mentioned in
an aside in the article. 41 That right has always been both
amorphous and very dependent on public perceptions of
what sort of uses of a person's persona require a license. I
don't think it's any accident that Jennifer Rothman, who
was doing similar work about the role of custom in
intellectual property back when I wrote the article, 42 ended
up as one of our premier experts on the right of publicity. 43
There are very similar dynamics at play.
I think there are also applications beyond
intellectual property law that have mostly been unexplored.
As I mentioned, I wrote one follow-on article myself, but it
was not about intellectual property; it was on tort law. 44
The idea was that negligence standards often draw on the
custom in the relevant industry.
Think medical
malpractice. But if doctors are risk-averse, or are simply
operating near the reasonable care line, there's a natural
tendency to pile on more care so as to distance oneself from
potential liability. That added care then becomes the
custom that defines negligence, which means the line shifts
and even more care is needed to stay clear of it. 45 Voila:
doctrinal feedback.
40

Shyamkrishna Balganesh, "Hot News": The Enduring Myth of
Property in News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 434-35 (2011) (hot news);
Noa Dreymann, John Doe's Right of Publicity, 32 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 673, 703 (2017) (right of publicity); Matthew Sag, Internet Safe
Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTREDAMEL.
REV. 499, 563 (2017) (notice-and-takedown).
41
Gibson, supra note 1, at 914 n.126.
42
See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in
Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007).
43
See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY
REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD (2018).
44
Gibson, supra note 35.
45
Id. at 1644-45.
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Speaking of tort law, I've wondered if there is
scholarly potential in a related issue. I have read of a box
of nails that says-and I swear I did not make this up"CAUTION!
Do NOT swallow nails!
May cause
irritation!" 46 If that sort of idiocy becomes prevalent, does
it form a new custom and thus a new standard of reasonable
care that exposes the nail-maker who fails to include the
warning to tort liability? If the dry cleaner has a sign that
says, "Not responsible for lost shirts," is that the final word
on the matter? Is it even relevant to determining liability if
they lose your shirt? One of my favorite examples of this
sort of thing is a sign on the back of a truck that was
transporting small rocks and gravel. 47 It says, "Not
responsible for broken windshield," and "Caution-stay
back over 100 feet-not responsible for road objects."
Setting aside the fact that you have to be much closer than
one hundred feet to even read the sign, what is the legal
effect of this assertion?
We see this same declarative overreach in
intellectual property too. I've wondered for a long time
whether another contributor to rights accretion is the
ridiculously broad public statements that rightsholders
make about their rights. The most familiar may be the one
that closes NFL broadcasts: "This telecast is copyrighted by
the NFL for the private use of our audience. Any other use
of this telecast or of any pictures, descriptions, or accounts
of the game without the NFL 's consent is prohibited" (A
very similar statement comes at the end of every CBS
broadcast of March Madness.) To which I say, seriously?
I am prohibited from publicly describing the game, or
giving an account of what happened? It's a moronic
46

Jane Easter Bahls, Better Safe ... , ENTREPRENEUR, July 1, 2003, at
76.
47
Photo on file with the author. I promise that I was not driving when
I took the picture.

60 IDEA 45 (2020)

Rights Accretion Redux

63

statement on its face, but its repet1t10n probably has an
effect on viewers and helps them form overbroad
impressions of the reach of copyright.
These overbroad public claims were something I
mentioned in a footnote, 48 but I think it might be worth an
article all on its own, one that goes beyond intellectual
property but uses intellectual property as an example.
Maybe call it Public Declarations of Private Law. 49 Now,
one might argue that these are contractual provisions,
which is the kind of argument that led me to start writing
about boilerplate; all the careful incentive/access balancing
done in intellectual property law could be undone if courts
have unrealistic views of what constitutes an enforceable
contractual term. But the contracts rationale involves some
tricky questions about assent, so it's an issue worth
exploring.
The other potential application I've wondered about
1s m Fourth Amendment doctrine. Since 1967's United
States v. Katz case, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
used as its lodestar our "reasonable expectations of
privacy." 50
But this invites circularity, as our privacy
48

Gibson, supra note 1, at 951 n.262; see also id. at 920 n.151 ("As
one court reluctantly concluded, 'Apparently, in this day and age when
professional sports teams franchise pennants, teeshirts, helmets,
drinking glasses and a wide range of other products, a substantial
number of people believe, if not told otherwise, that one cannot conduct
[a state lottery based on NFL games] without NFL approval.' NFL v.
Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Del. 1977)."). For an
article that focuses on this issue, see Jason Mazzone, Copy.fraud,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026 (2006).
49
In fact, let me try it out right now: "I hereby declare that Public
Declarations of Private Law is my idea and that any use of it or any
pictures, descriptions, or accounts of it without my consent is
prohibited."
50
See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
Although the "reasonable expectations" language
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expectations are formed, at least in part, by what intrusions
on privacy the law does and does not allow. The circularity
is particularly evident when technology makes possible
some new intrusion on privacy; when these intrusions first
emerge, we may have no expectations one way or the other
with regard to them-or we might view them as
unreasonable because they are not an intrusion we've
encountered before.
This means that our expectations could essentially
be manipulated (inadvertently, or not so inadvertently): the
public starts using a new technology, and does so long
enough and broadly enough that by the time the
government uses it to spy on us, we've gotten used to it and
view it as reasonable, and thus constitutional. For example,
it would be hard to have gone in one fell swoop from a
world in which your home was your castle to a world in
which the police could hover four hundred feet over your
property and peer through your window, as the government
was authorized to do in Florida v. Riley. 51 But when the
privacy intrusions accrete bit by bit, we adjust to them, as
do our expectations: before Florida v. Riley there was
California v. Ciraolo, which held that an airplane flyover at
one thousand feet, which looked directly down at the
property, was okay. 52
Indeed, after enough of these sorts of cases, the
Supreme Court essentially ratified the feedback effect in
2001, in Kyllo v. United States. 53 In that case, the police
suspected that Kyllo was using heat lamps to grow
marijuana indoors, so they used thermal 1magmg
originated in a concurrence, it has become the prevailing standard. See,
e.g., Carpenterv. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214-15 (2018).
51
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
52
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
53
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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technology to peer through the walls of his house and see if
there were suspiciously high levels of heat anywhere. 54 At
first, one might think that this case shows a Fourth
Amendment resistance to the erosion of privacy via
newfangled technologies, because Kyllo won the case-the
Court held that the use of the thermal imaging technology
was a search and required a warrant. 55 But in fact the
Court's reasoning buttresses the feedback argument:
[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the home's
interior that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical "intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area" constitutes a
search-at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general
.
56
publ 1c use.
So the problem was not the privacy violation
inherent in the government's peering through our walls
with some newfangled technology. The problem was that
the case had hit the courts too soon-not enough time had
passed for the public to get used to and widely adopt
thermal imaging equipment. "Don't worry," the Court was
saying, "if you wait long enough, your rights will erode."
Once we get used to Amazon's drones coming to our
doorstep and taking pictures of it, will it really violate our
expectations of privacy to have the government do the
same? Oy.

54

Id. at29-31.
Id. at 40.
56
Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512
(1961)).
55
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IV.

DEVELOPMENTS IN PRACTICE

That covers developments-real and imagined-in
scholarship. Now back to intellectual property and some
related developments in practice, by which I mean not just
litigation but in licensing. It's a mixed bag. Certainly, the
Copyright Clearance Center was given a huge boost by the
American Geophysical case, which held that a market for
personal archiving by academic researchers was likely to be
developed, 57 thereby making development of such a market
the only option-transaction costs be damned. 58 And
although I have described doctrinal feedback as an organic,
inadvertent process, there's no doubt that it could be
proactively manipulated by a strategically minded
rightsholder: offer users sweetheart deals to establish a
licensing market and then ramp up fees later when it's too
late to make a plausible fair use claim. I have not delved
into it, but I suspect that the significant ramp-up in digital
licensing costs for academic libraries may have originated
in that kind of strategy. 59
I think we came perilously close to a really bad
licensing market in the litigation over the Google Books
57

Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d
Cir. 1994).
58
I agree with the dissent in this case that the majority was engaging in
the very circular reasoning it sought to avoid. See id. at 937 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting) ("There is a circularity to the problem: the market will not
crystallize unless courts reject the fair use argument that Texaco
presents; but, under the statutory test, we cannot declare a use to be an
infringement unless (assuming other factors also weigh in favor of the
secondary user) there is a market to be harmed.").
59
See Stephen Bosch et al., Deal or No Deal: Periodicals Price Survey
2019, LIBRARY J. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.libraryjournal.co
m/?detailStory=Deal-or-No-Deal-Periodicals-Price-Survey-2019 [https
://perma.cc/AX79-ZP8V] (reporting average price increase of six
percent annually since 2012).
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project. We now think of the resulting case law as having
created more space for fair use, and that's true. 60 But that
was a second-best solution from Google's perspective.
Long before Google won its fair use cases, it tried to
convince the court to adopt a settlement that provided for
licensing-which the court rejected because it would have
gone beyond the rights at dispute in the case. 61 Had the
settlement happened, it might have been impossible for any
other defendant to argue fair use, and equally impossible
for any other defendant to strike such a licensing deal
itself. 62 Thankfully, the settlement did not happen, and
now others can take advantage of the fair use rights that the
litigation established.
Fortunately, there are some occasional mavericks
that push back against the licensing tendency. Right
around the time the article was published there was the Bill
Graham Archives v. Darling Kindersley Ltd case, in which
the Second Circuit noted that "a copyright holder cannot
prevent others from entering fair use markets merely 'by
developing or licensing a market for parody, news
reporting, educational or other transformative uses. "' 63
We've also seen pushback against expansive substantial
similarity holdings in cases like VMG Salsoul (the
Madonna case out of the Ninth Circuit), 64 which split from

60

See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015);
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTmst, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
61
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
62
I addressed this issue in James Gibson, Accidental Rights, 116
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 348 (2007) and James Gibson, Opinion,
Google's New Monopoly, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2008.
63
Bill Graham Archives v. Darling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605,
614-15 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Pub.
Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998)).
64
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
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the Sixth Circuit's crazy Bridgeport Music decision. 65 So I
may have been too pessimistic about the fate of such
mavericks, although I think they are probably few and far
between, and I suspect that the shadow of the clearance
culture hides a lot of potential mavericks who end up
cavmg.
One might also hope that rights accretion would
also be tempered by a friendlier judicial attitude toward
liability rules, instead of property rules, bled over from
patent law. After all, the patent remedies case of eBay v.
MercExchange cited copyright cases for its holding. 66 But
empirical work suggests that has not happened, 67 and as I
warned in the paper, it's not clear that that would lead to
less rights accretion anyway. 68
V.

AIRING OF GRIEVANCES

Finally, the airing of grievances. I don't really have
anything serious here, except maybe a lesson for younger
scholars.
My article has been cited a lot in other
scholarship and in briefs-so cry me a river, right?-but
it's never been cited by a court, as far as I know. It would
be nice to be cited by a court. So, if you have a piece of
scholarship that you think might be of use to courts, and
you would like to be cited, consider authoring amicus
briefs.

65

See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th
Cir. 2005) (inexplicably reading 17 U.S.C. § 114(a)-a statute that
explicitly limits the reach of sound recording copyrights-as expanding
that reach by doing away with the substantial similarity analysis).
66
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
67
See Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical
Study, 16LEWIS&CLARKL.REv. 215 (2012).
68
Gibson, supra note 1, at 945-46.
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Other than that, my only whinging is that I think the
article had something to say about trademark that has been
mostly overlooked-or maybe overtaken is the better
word. The most normatively neutral of the solutions I
offered for rights accretion was for courts to delve into the
why, not just the whether, of the relevant markets. 69 In
trademark, this translates into requiring rightsholders to
prove that consumer confusion is material to purchasing
decisions before liability is imposed. 70 No one goes to see
a movie because of the trademarked products in it-so even
if moviegoers are confused about whether licensing is
needed in that context, it shouldn't matter. In contrast,
when it comes to traditional uses of traditional marks, like
logos on packaging, I think we can assume materiality. Or
at least the burden should be on the defendant to disprove
it.
In the years since the article was published, this
notion has worked its way into a number of excellent
articles. 71 And I've usually been cited, but maybe not with
the acknowledgement that it was an essential moving part
in my trademark solution for the rights accretion problem.
Indeed, a recent post on trademark materiality on the
usually dependable Written Description blog summarized
all the trademark scholars who had worked on materiality. 72
69

Id. at 947-50.
Id. at 949-50.
71
E.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Rethinking PostSale Confusion, 108 TRADEMARK REP. 881 (2018); Rebecca Tushnet,
Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False
Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305 (2011); Mark A. Lemley &
Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 436-46
(2010).
72
Camilla Hrdy, Recent Critiques of Post-Sale Confusion: Is
Materiality the Answer?, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION BLOG (Nov. 11, 2018,
12:50 PM), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2018/11/recent-criti
ques-of-post-sale-confusion.html [https://perma.cc/43A5-BPNC].
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Except one. Sigh. (To be fair, my article was not as recent
as the others, and every scholar probably thinks that his or
her work is more inspirational to others than it really is.)
So maybe that's a takeaway for younger scholars: if
you think you have a good idea, flog it. Get it in print early
and often, and don't worry about writing narrower
scholarship if that's what it takes to stake a claim and
expand on an idea that you have theretofore only
mentioned in passing. I have always tended to wait until I
have a magnum opus (or what I think is one) before I
publish, which probably is not the best way to build a
career. But who am I to complain? I got picked for the
Intellectual Property Redux.
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